Boston Criminal Lawyers Blog

In Massachusetts, it is a crime to lie to or mislead a police officer, or otherwise impede a criminal investigation.

Under the Intimidation of a Witness statute, the Massachusetts legislature criminalized conduct where a person willfully misled or lied to a person furthering a criminal investigation with the intent to impede or obstruct justice.

In one recent case, Commonwealth v. Patrick Fortuna, the Massachusetts Appeals court considered a case where the defendant had been shot. While being treated at the hospital, he was interviewed by the police about who had shot him. He told the police that he was shot while walking home and didn't know by whom, because the shooter had been far away.

During questioning, however, the police officer noticed what appeared to be gunshot residue near his wound and on his clothing. When the officer questioned the defendant about the gunshot residue, the defendant became confrontational and refused to answer any further questions.

At trial, the prosecutor called a forensics experts from the Boston Police crime lab who offered testimony that, based on the chemical testing of the gunshot residue on the defendant's clothing, he had been shot from a distance of no more than 18 inches. Based on this testimony, a jury then convicted the defendant of Intimidation of a Witness for intentional misleading a criminal investigation.

In considering the defendant's appeal of his conviction, the Appeals Court ruled that where the defendant's account differed from the account of the forensic expert, a jury was able to infer that the defendant had lied or intentionally misled police.

It seems almost paradoxical that a person has a right to remain silent by asserting his Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, yet can be prosecuted and sentenced to prison for lying to police for fear of facing criminal prosecution. The better practice, under the law, would be simple to refuse to answer any questions and consult with an attorney.

Continue reading "Misleading a Police Officer is a Crime in Massachusetts" »

Those convicted of any crime in Massachusetts should always consider challenging their conviction by filing an appeal. One way to litigate a Massachusetts Appeal is asking the trial judge to consider a Motion for New Trial based on undisclosed evidence by the prosecution.

In order to secure a new trial on the basis of undisclosed evidence, a defendant must be able to establish 3 things:

1. the evidence was in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor;


2. the evidence is potentially exculpatory (e.g., tends to show evidence of innocence); and


3. the prosecutor's failure in disclosing the evidence prejudiced the defendant.

In a case recently litigated before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant had filed a Motion for New Trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to produce exculpatory evidence.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Murray, the defendant had been convicted of 1st Degree Murder. During the trial, the defendant had brought forward a theory of manslaughter based on the assertion that the victim was a gang member. The trial judge, however, did not allow the defendant to refer to the assertion that the decedent and his friends were part of a "gang", but only allowed him to reference their affiliation as a "group". During the trial, the witnesses also denied they were part of a gang; and a police officer who testified at trial also stated that he wasn't sure that the decent was a member of that 'group'.

Two years after the trial, 20 members of that gang were indicted by state and federal prosecutors. Those indictments, however, contained an affidavit that referenced this group as a violent street gang; identified 3 of the witnesses who testified at trial as gang members; and also identified the decedent as a gang member.

Even though that the defendant's attorney had not specifically requested the gang related information prior to the trial, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Motion for New Trial on the basis that the information contained in the affidavit could "bolster [the defendant's] theory of the case, contradict the testimony of [witnesses], and demonstrate their motive to lie."

In this regard, as a result of the newly discovered evidence, the judge ruled that there was a 'substantial miscarriage of justice' because, if the jury had heard this evidence, they could have reached a different verdict.

Contact a Massachusetts Criminal Appeals Lawyer.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Criminal Appeals: New Trial Motions" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Romero, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a split-decision where the defendant, charged with Massachusetts Gun Crimes, challenged his conviction based on insufficient evidence for "constructive possession".

The defendant in the case was in the driver's seat of a parked car - he was the owner and operator in the car - along with three other passengers who were sitting in the car as well. At 1:30 a.m., a police officer drove past the car and testified that, as he drove by, he could only see the top of 4 peoples' heads because they were crouching down in their seats. Upon seeing this, the officer turned around and parked behind the defendant's car.

As the officer began to approach the car, from about 3 feet away, he testified he could see in the car and from his vantage point one of the rear passengers reach towards the front of the car through the two front seats, this while the defendant/driver was looking side to side and also looking at the front seat passenger, who was looking at an object in his hand.

When the officer shined the flashlight into the car, the front seat passenger dropped the object in his lap, which turned out to be a gun. The defendant denied any knowledge of the gun being in the car. At trial, the defendant testified that when he picked up the front seat passenger, he showed him a gun and that he had touched it.

In his appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial as to Unlawful Possession of a Firearm based on "constructive possession".

Under Massachusetts criminal law, in order to prove "constructive possession", the Commonwealth must establish knowledge on the part of the defendant, coupled with the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the object. The court has recognized that mere presence, without more, is not enough to demonstrate knowledge or ability to and intent to exercise dominion and control, but could be inferred with the presence of other incriminating evidence.

The Appeals Court in this case rejected the defendant's challenge that there was insufficient evidence of knowledge and held that because the gun was on the lap of the front seat passenger and the defendant was sitting next to him, the evidence was sufficient.

With regard to whether there was sufficient evidence of "ability and intent to exercise control" of the gun, the Appeals Court was divided. Unfortunately, the majority relied on several "plus factors", in addition to mere presence, that warranted the inference that the defendant intended to exercise control over the firearm. Among the "plus factors" the Appeals Court relied upon were (1) ownership of the vehicle; (2) the defendant was the operator of the car; and (3) the defendant's proximity to the person who had the gun, which was in plain view (and not hidden). The court also noted other "incriminatory factors" that suggested "intent", including that the occupants were slouching down, the location of the incident on a dark street; and the time of night.

In reaching its decision, the majority of the Appeals Court reasoned that:

I believe the dissent, however, correctly pointed out that the majority in this decision essentially created a new strict liability for vehicle owners or operators, even if they truly had not intent to possess a weapon or any other unlawful object. The dissent cautioned that "courts may now punish an owner or operator of an automobile, or a property owner, for simply tolerating the presence of a weapon or contraband within the limits of their proprietary interest."

Moving forward, one would hope that a further appeal is taken and the matter is review by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Appeals Court Issues Detrimental Opinion on "Constructive Possession"" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Robert McGillivary, the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed the legal issue as to whether an intoxicated driver, who only puts the key in the vehicle's ignition without turning the car on, can be found guilty of Drunk Driving in Massachusetts.

By way of background, Robert McGillivary was convicted after trial of Operating Under the Influence of Alcohol. At trial, the evidence presented by the prosecutor was simply that he was found in the passenger's seat of the car and had turned the ignition key once to activate the car's power - but not further to turn the car on. At some point, the defendant testified that he had moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat, but did not recall ever putting the keys in the ignition. He ultimately found by the police slumped over the steering wheel. At his trial, there was absolutely no evidence that he actually drove the car at all.

McGillivary was convicted after trial and he appealed his conviction arguing that simply turning the car's power on was not "operation" for purposes of the crime of Operating Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, said that it was...

In reaching its decision, the court relied on previous Massachusetts caselaw that defined "operation" as anytime a person intentionally does an act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence sets in motion the motive power of that vehicle.

In following that definition, the court explained that turning the key in the ignition to the "on" position could therefore constitute a part of a sequence that would set the vehicle's engine in motion, thereby constituting "operation."

In my reading of this opinion, there is still an argument to be made that simply putting the keys in the ignition, without turning or activating the electrical power, does not constitute "operation" for purposes of Massachusetts Drunk Driving Laws.

The lesson learned here then, ladies and gentlemen, is that if you are in any way intoxicated and pass out in the car, make sure the keys are not in the ignition...

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Simply Putting Key In Ignition Enough for DUI / Drunk Driving" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently decided and rejected Christopher McCowen's appeal of his conviction for the Murder of Christa Worthington in 2002. In a unanimous decision, Massachusetts' highest court unanimously ruled that the defendant's appeal was without merit and found "no basis on which to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial."

Christopher McCowen, of Hyannis, Massachusetts, was convicted of the Rape and Murder of Christa Worthington in 2002 in her home in Truro on Cape Cod. McCowen was found by a jury to have first raped and then stabbed her. Worthington was found in her home as her 2.5 year old daughter was against her mother's lifeless body. The daughter was unharmed.

Despite McCowen having lost his appeal, the decision did raise some concerns, particularly with racial issues that were made public shortly after the trial, raising the concern of racial bias during jury deliberations. Specifically, after the conviction, it was revealed that, during jury deliberations, for example, one white female juror referred to McCowen as "a big black man" who had been trying to intimidate her by staring at her in the courtroom. She also stated that bruises like those found on the victim's body would result when "a big black man beats up on a small woman" These statements obviously offended fellow jurors, and in particular, a black female juror, which led to a confrontation within the jury room. As a result of these and other allegations of racial impropriety having occurred during jury deliberations, the trial judge held a 2-day hearing a year after McCowen's conviction in 2006.

Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Therefore, once a defendant files an affidavit from a juror who alleges that one or more jurors made statements that reasonably demonstrate racial or ethnic bias, and the credibility of the affidavit is in issue, the trial should should conduct a hearing to determine the truth or falsity of the affidavit's allegations.

That is what was done in McCowen's case with all the jurors over 2 days. Writing for the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Justice Ireland did not disagree with the trial judge's decision to hold such a hearing, but did state that he would have interviewed jurors more thoroughly. He elaborated that further questioning "would have given context and insight into whether" the comments and issues raised during jury deliberations were "simply small talk or indicative of implicit bias."

Notwithstanding the severe racial issues raised, the trial judge found that the juror who made those statements "did not hold actual racial bias" and concluded that the black female juror's response served the purpose of "blunting the effect" of the racial stereotype and of warning the jury of the risk of racial stereotypes infecting their deliberations.

...so in other words, there were racial issues that were of concern to the court during jury deliberations, but they did not rise to the level necessary to warrant "actual" racial bias? ...I respectfully disagree with the court's decision. McCowen should have gotten a new trial...

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rejects McCowen's Appeal of Conviction for Christa Worthington Murder" »

In an opinion released this morning, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today reversed the First Degree Murder conviction against Jerome McNulty, who in 2001, had been convicted of the murder of Linda Correia, 27, in her Salem bedroom.

In its decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that McNulty's right to be informed by the Salem Police Department of his criminal lawyer's attempt to provide advice to him had been violated. Consequently, it was error for the judge at his murder trial to admit into evidence McNulty's signed statement that he made to the Salem Police Department.

When an attorney representing a person held in custody makes it known to the police that he is seeking to reach his client to provide legal services, the police have an affirmative duty to inform the suspect immediately of the attorney's efforts. Even if the suspect had previously agreed to speak with the police, once the attorney makes that request, the suspect must be informed of his lawyer's efforts to reach him and the suspect's prior consent is invalid. Failure to do so results in a violation of a suspect's constitutional right to counsel.

No matter what the circumstances or the charges, no suspect or person in custody should agree to speak with the police unless they have first consulted with an attorney and have a lawyer present during any interviews.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Throws Out Salem Murder Conviction" »

Lawyers for John Odgren appealed to Middlesex Superior Court Judge S. Jane Haggerty earlier this week, appealing that his sentence be reduced from First Degree Murder to Second Degree Murder.

Convicted of First Degree Murder for killing 15 year-old classmate James Alenson at Lincoln-Sudbury High School in 2007, Odgren was sentenced to serve a mandatory life sentence in state prison, without the possibility of parole. If the petition was successful, John Odgren would have been parole eligible after serving 15 years in prison.

Although Odgren's defense focused on Insanity / Lack of Criminal Responsibility, arguing that he was insane at the time of the murder because of his history of emotional problems and mental health issues, including Asperger's Syndrome. Jurors that heard the case found that he was, in fact, sane at the time of the stabbing.

Continue reading "John Odgren Loses Appeal for Reduced Murder Sentence" »

Sheila Barry, of Brockton, Massachusetts, was convicted in 2006 in Plymouth Superior Court for the Murder of Admilson Goncalves. Today, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed her conviction, citing she was mentally ill when she committed the assault.

At her Murder trial, Plymouth County prosecutors alleged that Barry attacked Goncalves with a cinder block as he sat in his bicycle in Brockton in 2002 and that she continued to beat and assault him with the brick until it shattered.

In reversing her Murder conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules regarding a defendant claiming an Insanity Defense need to be changed. Prior to this decision, a defendant who voluntarily consumed alcohol could not then claim the Defendant of Lack of Responsibility, or more commonly known as the Insanity Defense.

At her trial, Barry's defense team called 5 mental health experts who testified that she was bipolar and likely also suffered from schizoaffective disorder, which sometimes leads to delusional thoughts. At one point, for example, Barry claimed that Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Center on her behalf.

In changing the status of the law, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules precluding a defending from claiming an Insanity Defense if he/she voluntarily consumes alcohol need to be changed. As a result of this decision, the Supreme Court contemplated the law to allow juries to consider whether a defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol activates, intensifies or otherwise has any affect on the person's mental illness.

Insanity Defense or Lack of Criminal Responsibility:
Under the law in Massachusetts, a person is not guilty of a crime if he lacked the 'criminal responsibility' when he committed the crime. By definition, a person is lacking in criminal responsibility if he suffers from a mental disease or defect, and as a result, either he is substantially unable to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct, or he is substantially unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

When the Defense of Lack of Criminal Responsibility (Insanity Defense) is raised, the burden is not on the defendant to prove any lack of criminal responsibility. Rather, the prosecutor must then prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the offense charged and that he was sane when he did so.

If the prosecutor persuades the jury that the defendant committed the crime charged and did not have a mental disease or defect when he committed the crime, then the jury could find that the defendant was criminally responsible.

If, however, the jurors have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect, then in order to find him criminal responsible, the prosecutor must prove that, despite any mental disease or defect, the defendant nevertheless possessed substantial capacity both to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct and was able to conform his conduct to the law.

Continue reading "Brockton Woman Gets Murder Conviction Reversed by Massachusetts Supreme Court" »

After 7 years, Jesus Silva Santiago walked out of court a free man, a second jury acquitting him of Murder in connection with the shooting death of Eugene Monteiro, 25, of Boston, Massachusetts.

The Murder allegations stemmed from an incident at Mike's Lounge in Brockton. The Plymouth County District Attorney alleged that Santiago called the victim a racial slur as he and his friends headed into the bar, saying they weren't allowed in the club. As the victim and his friends left the bar because one was underage, they passed Santiago again and he allegedly shot the victim in the chest. The Plymouth County District Attorney's Office alleged that Santiago went into the bar after the shooting because there was no other place to hide as the police were on their way.

Santiago, 35, was in custody since 2003. At his first trial in 2006, he was convicted of Murder, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned the conviction and automatic life sentence and ordered a new trial. At this second trial, a jury consisting of 4 men and 8 women deliberated 8 hours and finally acquitted him this past Thursday.

After his first trial where a jury convicted him of Murder, Santiago appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court committed error by denying his pre-trial Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications. He also claimed additional errors by the trial judge, specifically, that the judge impermissibly refused his attorneys to show evidence pertaining to an inadequate police investigation.

Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the pre-trial order denying his Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications, the Supreme Court did find error with regards to denying Santiago the opportunity to admit evidence concerning an inadequate police investigation.

Boston Criminal Lawyer Cautions Against Wrongful Convictions:
Despite having what is considered to be the premier judicial system in the world, our system of justice is not without its flaws. A wrongful conviction can occur in a number of way, the most common being Mistaken Identifications and police misconduct.

Since 1989, the Innocence Project has found that there have been 258 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States - 192 since the year 2000 alone. Most pointedly, 17 of the 258 exonerations have been people who were serving time on Death Row in various states.

According to statistics, 75% of DNA exonerations have involved mistaken eyewitness identifications. Of one of the least known mistaken identity cases involved United States President Abraham Lincoln who used the defense of mistaken identification to defend William "Duff" Armstrong in 1858. President Lincoln used a farmer's almanac to prove that a witness could not have seen Armstrong in the moonlight, as the position of the moon that night could not have provided sufficient illumination - his client was acquitted.
Case in point, in the picture above, witnesses mistakenly identified the men on the right and left as the person responsible for rapes. The actual perpetrator of the crime, however, was the man in the middle.

Continue reading "Brockton Man Acquitted of Murder after Massachusetts Supreme Court Overturns First Murder Conviction" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today reversed the conviction of Joann Silech-Brodeur, who was convicted of the Murder of her 70 year-old husband by stabbing him to death 34 times.

At issue in Silech-Brodeur's Criminal Appeal was whether, in establishing her Insanity Defense, the defense was obligated to give prosecutors copies of the detailed notes and statements Silech-Brodeur made to her defense psychiatric expert. She claimed that she was suffering mental problems at the time that were exacerbated by her husband's intent to divorce her. The defense psychologist testified at the trial that, during her examinations, Silech-Brodeur claimed she did not recall stabbing her husband and that the lost her sense of sight and sound during the struggle.

The trial judge, over the defendant's objection, ordered production of the defense psychologist's notes to be produced to the prosecution's own expert. This, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, went beyond the discovery limitations in Insanity Cases. The Court specifically held that "when a defendant serves notice that she will call an expert witness to testify about her mental condition at the time of the crime based on her testimonial statements, the rule only authorizes a court-ordered psychiatric examination of the defendant by the Commonwealth's expert, and nothing more."

Notwithstanding its ruling, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cited a trend toward mutual discovery and recommended that the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure review the issue and perhaps propose an amendment that might require a defendant's expert to give notice of the expert's opinion, as well as the bases for that opinion.

Click here to read the full Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Silech-Brodeur.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Orders New Trial in Murder Case" »

In reversing the Gun Crimes convictions of two men, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that police officers can no longer frisk someone during a routine encounter unless they have 'reasonable suspicion' to believe the person is involved in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jamal Martin, that defendant had been convicted of Carrying a Firearm Without a License, Carrying a Loaded Firearm, and Assault & Battery on a Police Officer. The incident occurred on October 8, 2006, when, at 10:30 a.m., Boston Police Officers were patrolling a 'high crime area' in which 'numerous shootings' had occurred and looking for a specific juvenile to execute an arrest warrant. During their patrol, they observed a young man wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up around his face and walking in the opposite direction from which the police were traveling. Although the police could not see his face, they 'thought' that this person might have an outstanding default warrant...[how does that make sense when they couldn't see his face?]

The police turned their cruiser around and engaged the young man, a teenager, in conversation. Although the police quickly realized this young man was not the person they were looking for, and simply because the young man refused to continue to speak with the police, they proceeded to ask him if he had any weapons. Despite that Martin responded that he did not, the police nonetheless continued to frisk them "for their safety." The frisk revealed a loaded gun.

In reversing Martin's conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that when an individual is stopped and searched, the police conduct must satisfy two conditions.

1. The investigatory stop must be lawful. In a street encounter, that requirement is met with the police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a crime.


2. To then engage the person in a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.

The police can't just go up to people, without legitimate reason, and just detain and search them...In my opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's recent decision serves as a message to law enforcement officers to pull the reigns a bit on questionable police practices.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Police Need 'Reasonable Suspicion' to Conduct Pat Frisks" »

If you have been following this blog, you have seen several recent posts about criminal convictions being reversed as a result of the Melendez-Diaz and Crawford decisions. These decisions have dramatically changed the landscape of permissible 'testimonial' evidence against a defendant at trial, but the scope of these decisions is limited.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Dale McMullin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pulled the reigns, so to speak, on the scope of Melendez-Diaz. The criminal defendant in this case was charged with several drunk driving related offenses, including Operating of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Liquor, Fourth Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 24(1)(a)(1); Operating After Suspension, Second Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 23); and Failure to Stop for a Police Officer (M.G.L. c. 90, section 25). After his criminal conviction, the defendant appealed challenging the admissibility, competency and sufficiency of the public records used to establish his prior convictions.

Although the defendant acknowledged that the admissibility of Registry of Motor Vehicle records was permitted by Commonwealth v. Maloney, he argued that the Maloney decision was based on the Confrontation Clause analysis in Commonwealth v. Verde, which was later overturned by Melendez-Diaz.

In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained that Melendez-Diaz explicitly acknowledged that a clerk's affidavit authenticating an official record is not 'testimonial' for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, business and public records are generally admissible and not confrontational because they have been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purposes of proving some fact at trial.

Continue reading "Court Documents Admitted in Drunk Driving Trial Not Violative of Sixth Amendment's Right to Confrontation" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Jorge Vasquez, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently overturned the conviction of the defendant, who had been tried and convicted of Possession of Cocaine, as well as Distribution of Cocaine. Despite his criminal defense lawyer's failing to object at trial to the admission of the Massachusetts State Police Crime Laboratory Certificates of Drug Analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court still reversed his convictions as a result of his being deprive of his Right to Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

At his criminal trial, the prosecutor did not call the Massachusetts State Police Crime Analyst at trial, but simply admitted the 'Drug Certificates'. The Drug Certificates were signed by the analyst, but the court found a Sixth Amendment violation because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the drug analyst. Although this was the preferred practice not too long ago, in the recent case of Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court ruled that drug certificates are testimonial in nature whose admission into evidence against a criminal defendant triggers the protections of the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court further ruled that, without the admission of the Drug Certificates or testimony certifying the seized substances were, in fact, cocaine, the defendant's convictions on the charges could not stand and must be reversed. Although there was evidence that the 'substances' were "consistent with cocaine" and testimony from police officers relating to the likeness of the substances with cocaine, this was simply circumstantial evidence. Although a conviction can stand on only circumstantial evidence, the convictions in this case had to be reversed because the court could not say whether a jury would still have convicted had the improperly introduced Drug Certificates not been introduced.

Notably, that the defendant's criminal defense attorney did not object at trial to the admission of the Drug Certificate was not held against him during at his appeal of his convictions. The Supreme Court explained that, because an objection to the admission of the Drug Certificate would have been futile, the rationale for denying the defendant review on this issue doesn't apply.

Continue reading "Drug Conviction Overturned for Constitutional Violation" »

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jason Loadholt, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled on whether a defendant's criminal prosecution for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition is violative of a person's 'right to bear arms' as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In his appeal to the SJC for his Gun/Firearms Charges, the defendant claimed that Massachusetts could not prosecute him for the various gun and ammunitions charges for not first having obtained a Firearms Identification Card because the United States Constitution guaranteed him, via the Second Amendment, his 'Right to Bear Arms'.

In rejecting the defendant's Constitutional claims in his appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned, citing United States v. Cruikshank, that the Second Amendment "does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government." Rather, the Second Amendment means that it shall not be infringed any further by Congress, as opposed to the States. The Court explained that the Second Amendment "is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government."

At the end of the day, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment guarantees only an individuals right to keep and bear arms for defensive purposes. Without explicit saying as much, the Court seems to have upheld the requirement of obtaining a Firearms Identification Card for purposes of firearms and ammunition possession.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rejects Challenge for Gun Rights" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recent decision of Commonwealth v. Porter P., a juvenile, focused on whether a person temporarily staying in room in a homeless transitional center is entitled to a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' against unlawful searches and searches. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a 5-2 decision, ruled that they do!

By way of background, the juvenile defendant and his mother had moved into a room at the Roxbury Multi-Service Center Family House Shelter in March 2006, which provides temporary housing for homeless families and assists them towards securing a permanent home. A few months later, the shelter's director heard rumors that the juvenile defendant had a gun and then contacted the Boston Police Department. The next morning, five Boston Police Officers arrived at the shelter, and with the permission from the Roxbury shelter's directors, searched the juvenile's room and found a .40 caliber Glock firearm. The juvenile was immediately arrested for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm; Unlawful Possession of Ammunition; and Delinquency.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in ruling for the juvenile defendant, found that

"the room that the juvenile and his mother shared at the shelter was a transitional living space, but it was nonetheless their home...".

Justice Ralph Gants, the author of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in this case, ruled that even the shelter's director did not have the 'actual authority' to consent to the police entry into the room to search for a gun. Justice Gants explained that the Roxbury shelter's director was not a co-inhabitant of the room, and although the shelter's guidelines permitted them to call the police, the guidelines did not expressly authorize the police to enter a resident's room and to search for evidence of a crime without consent or a warrant.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Homeless Shelters Entitled to 4th Amendment Privacy Protections" »