Boston Criminal Lawyers Blog

In a recent case, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the dismissal of a juvenile defendant's Murder dismissal, but also establishing new parameters in murder cases involving juvenile defendants who are to be tried as adults.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Javon Walczak, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the trial court properly dismissed an indictment against the juvenile defendant who was charged with Second Degree Murder. The prosecution had presented evidence that the defendant, who was 16 at the time, stabbed the victim (Rene Valdez) when the victim and an accomplice tried to rob him.

Following the defendant's arraignment in the Superior Court, a judge dismissed the indictment because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to the grand jury establishing the offense of second degree murder.

Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial judge's findings and held that there was, in fact, probable cause for the charge of second degree murder, the court also held that the grand jury should have been instructed by the prosecution on the elements of murder, as well as the legal significance of mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence.

The Court specifically held that:

"In any case where the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder, the grand jury must be properly instructed by the prosecutor on the elements of murder, and if there are mitigating circumstances and defenses...raised by the evidence, the grand jury must be instructed as to that as well."

The basis for the court's ruling is that, unlike other crimes, a murder indictment against a juvenile adds significant other consequences, including the case being tried in the superior court, whereas for any other crime he would be tried in the juvenile court.

Presently, the Massachusetts criminal justice system treats juvenile defendants in one of three ways:

If a juvenile is charged by way of a complaint, he may be committed to the Department of Youth Services until the age of 18;

If a juvenile is charged by way of an indictment, he may be classified as a youthful offender and face more severe penalties than a juvenile tried as a delinquent, including the sentence that would be applicable to an adult defendant charged with the same crime;

In circumstances where the juvenile is charged with murder, however, both of these above are inapplicable because the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a person between the ages of 14 and 17 and the juvenile defendant indicted for murder must be tried according to the same criminal proceedings as if he were an adult.

For these reasons, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the grand jury must be presented with the elements of the crime and be apprised of any mitigating circumstances to ensure that the integrity of the grand jury process is maintained.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Upholds Murder Dismissal of Juvenile Lynn Defendant" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court last week ruled that police officers are not required to obtain a search warrant before they can search an arrestee's cell phone call list following an arrest.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Demetrius A. Phifer, the state's highest court rules that a search of a drug dealer's cell phone call list was not a constitutional violation because it was a limited search and they had probable cause to believe the recent call list would reveal evidence relating to the crime for which he was arrested.

The defendant in this case was arrested after Boston Police allegedly saw him get into a car with a known drug use and engage in actions they believed was a drug transaction. After the police pulled his car over, they got his cell number and checked it against the cellphone they had seized from the buyer and determined the number was in the other's call list.

This search, the court ruled, was a lawful search incident to arrest.

Notably, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court left undecided and did not go as far to making a bright-line rule that a search of a cell phone incident to arrest is valid under all circumstances; and if so, to what extent.

In limiting its decision, the court also did not go as far as extending this ruling to other areas of cell phone contents, such as texts and e-mails.

The court's decision, unfortunately, could lead to further constitutional violations by police and law enforcement in general. With vague parameters, police will undoubtedly now further exploit the constitutional limits of this case and certainly try to extend the scope of what is permissible to other areas.

Practically speaking, there is no need for this ruling, as it just gives the police unfettered authority to search for evidence without restrictions. The alternative, which would be requiring police to obtain a warrant before conducting a cell phone search, would ensure that police have the requisite probable cause to conduct such a search.

Further, there would be no harm in requiring police to get a warrant. Arguably, the person is already arrested and the cell phone is already in evidence so there is no danger that the contents on the phone might be damaged or destroyed. By requiring a warrant to be obtained, all citizens' constitutional rights would be fully protected.

Notably, in reaching its decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied, in part, on a California case which held that "...although an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished concerning his or her physical person when subject to a lawful arrested and taken into custody, the same may not necessarily be true with respect to the privacy of the myriad types of information stored in a cellular telephone that he or she is carrying at the time of arrest."

The reality, however, is that cell phones today are not the cell phones of even 5 years ago. Where most people today now store very personal and highly information on the phones (credit card info., bank accounts, personal contacts and communications, etc. etc.), the public today does, in fact, perceive their cell phone and the data within to be very personal and confidential, not meant for the public. We do, therefore, have a tremendous expectation of privacy in these devices and the court's ruling here, unfortunately, contradicts this reality.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Court Rules Search of Drug Dealers Phone After Arrest Valid" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently reversed the conviction of William Santos, who in 2008 was convicted of the Murder of Luis Daniel Rodriguez during an alleged drug deal. Declaring that certain evidence was improperly admitted at his trial, the court has ordered a new trial.

Prior to his trial, Santos had argued that certain statements he allegedly made to police should have been excluded from trial because he had invoked his constitutional right to remain silent and asked to speak with an attorney. At the time, the judge in the case ruled that he wasn't in 'custody' and therefore, Miranda warnings are not required. The prosecution also pointed out that despite asking for an attorney, he continued to speak to police.

Miranda warning are technically only necessary when the person is subject to interrogation by law enforcement AND he is in custody or in a custodial setting.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, overruled that decision, holding that once there was an unequivocal invocation of his right to speak with an attorney, the interview should have been terminated immediately and the police should not have allowed him to continue to speak.

In all my years in defending persons charged with any crime, I have yet to see a case where the defendant spoke to the police and it benefitted him. In the vase majority of cases where my clients have made statements, the clients then assert that their words were taken out of context, changed and have even denied making statements altogether.

There is a reason why there is a constitutional right to remain silent, for not other reason that whatever you say can and will be used against you in court. Chances are, if the police are questioning you and think you're a suspect, they're not asking questions to help you - they're asking questions to build a strong case and bury you when you get charged.

Unequivocally, the better and safest practice in ANY circumstances is to NOT answer any questions without first speaking to a lawyer.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Court Reverses Murder Conviction for Lowell Man" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently considered a case where a Milford woman was charged with Murder when she gave birth without medical assistance that resulted in the death of the baby (the baby was later found in the trash).

In its decision, the Court refused to impose a duty upon women that they must seek medical intervention when undergoing unassisted childbirth. The court thereby affirms a person's protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.

In this case, the Massachusetts woman realized she was pregnant after missing her period and then taking a home pregnancy test. She didn't tell anyone about the pregnancy and chose not to see a doctor. Approximately 6 months later, the woman believed she was experiencing a miscarriage and her water broke. After 5 minutes, the baby emerged from her body but was blue.

The woman told police she made repeated attempts to scoop out the baby's mouth and made rescue breaths, but the baby's color never changed and she did not notice the baby cry or move. After not being able to resuscitate the baby, she disposed of the baby in the trash. The police discovered the baby's body a few days later.

The Worcester District Attorney's Office ultimately charged the woman with Murder and, after trial, a jury convicted her. The Supreme Judicial Court however, reversed the conviction and ruled that prosecutor's failed to prove that the woman's decision not to seek medical help was the cause of the child's death. The Court distinguished this case from one where a woman intentionally foregoes medical assistance with the intent to kill her fetus; or where a woman undergoes unassisted childbirth after she was told doing so could jeopardize the baby's life.

Essentially, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that someone can be subject to criminal liability if a viable fetus is intentionally killed, but this was not the case. In this case, the Court ruled that there was no evidence that the woman had any intention of killing her own fetus simply because she elected to not have medical treatment.

See court's full opinion at Commonwealth v. Allissa Pugh.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Court Reverses Woman's Murder Conviction in Death of Baby During Labor" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Leslie Burton-Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the issue of whether a gun, manufactured before 1900, were unlawful to own/possess under the Massachusetts' Gun Crimes Laws.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, Unlawful Possession of Ammunition, and Unlawful Possession of a Loaded Firearm. In his appeal, the defendant asserted that his convictions should be overturned because the gun at issue was manufactured before 1900, and under the law as written, he could lawfully possess the firearm with having been issued a license to carry.

Under the statute which criminalized the possession of a firearm without a license, the language further reads that the "...provisions of the [statute] shall not apply to...any firearms, rifle, or shotgun manufactured in or prior to the year 1899."

In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court resounded that, given the language of the statute, the defendant could not have been convicted of unlawfully possession this antique gun. The SJC went even further and overruled a prior Massachusetts Appeals Court case which had previously ruled that no "antique gun exemption" existed.

Moving forward, where a defendant is charged with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, attorneys should give the appropriate pre-trial notice to rely on the affirmative defense of exemption so that the defendant could demonstrate to the jury, through expert testimony, that the gun is, in fact, an antique.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Court Rules Antique Guns Exempt from Criminal Statute" »

The United States Supreme Court today heard arguments in the cases of Jackson v. Hobbs and Miller v. Alabama on the issue of whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 8th Amendment, to sentence a youthful offender to life without the possibility of parole. The decision result in a change to Massachusetts law, which currently allows for juvenile life sentences without parole.

By way of background, the court has previously ruled against similar punishments for youth and adult offenders in the past. In 2005, the Court prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for any minor convicted of murder in the case of Roper v. Simmons. Then, in 2010, in the case of Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of a life without the possibility of parole sentence for a minor who committed any crime other than murder.

In both of those cases, the Supreme Court ruled that, due to the immaturity of youthful judgment and moral sense, those punishments were unconstitutional and therefore a form of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment. With those cases as a backdrop, attorneys are urging the court to rule that a sentence of life without parole for the crime of murder is also too severe and unconstitutional.

The decision could have long reaching implications to several cases, including those in Massachusetts, such as the case of John Odgren, who as a teenager, was convicted of First Degree Murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He was 16 at the time of the murder.

Prior to 1996, juveniles charged with murder in Massachusetts would have their cases tried in Juvenile Court. In 1996, however, the Massachusetts legislature amended the law which now mandates that juveniles between the ages of 14 and 17 who are charged with murder to have their cases transferred to adult court. In Massachusetts alone, there are 59 inmates who were charged with murder before they were 18. Notably, 38 other states have passed similar laws permitting juveniles to be sentenced to life without parole sentences for murder.

The indication from reporters, following oral arguments, is that the United States Supreme Court will lean towards ruling that sentencing youthful offenders to life without the possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual punishment. ...but the official decision is not expected until sometime this summer.

Continue reading "US Supreme Court Considers Constitutionality of Life Sentences for Youthful Offenders" »

In Massachusetts, it is a crime to lie to or mislead a police officer, or otherwise impede a criminal investigation.

Under the Intimidation of a Witness statute, the Massachusetts legislature criminalized conduct where a person willfully misled or lied to a person furthering a criminal investigation with the intent to impede or obstruct justice.

In one recent case, Commonwealth v. Patrick Fortuna, the Massachusetts Appeals court considered a case where the defendant had been shot. While being treated at the hospital, he was interviewed by the police about who had shot him. He told the police that he was shot while walking home and didn't know by whom, because the shooter had been far away.

During questioning, however, the police officer noticed what appeared to be gunshot residue near his wound and on his clothing. When the officer questioned the defendant about the gunshot residue, the defendant became confrontational and refused to answer any further questions.

At trial, the prosecutor called a forensics experts from the Boston Police crime lab who offered testimony that, based on the chemical testing of the gunshot residue on the defendant's clothing, he had been shot from a distance of no more than 18 inches. Based on this testimony, a jury then convicted the defendant of Intimidation of a Witness for intentional misleading a criminal investigation.

In considering the defendant's appeal of his conviction, the Appeals Court ruled that where the defendant's account differed from the account of the forensic expert, a jury was able to infer that the defendant had lied or intentionally misled police.

It seems almost paradoxical that a person has a right to remain silent by asserting his Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, yet can be prosecuted and sentenced to prison for lying to police for fear of facing criminal prosecution. The better practice, under the law, would be simple to refuse to answer any questions and consult with an attorney.

Continue reading "Misleading a Police Officer is a Crime in Massachusetts" »

Those convicted of any crime in Massachusetts should always consider challenging their conviction by filing an appeal. One way to litigate a Massachusetts Appeal is asking the trial judge to consider a Motion for New Trial based on undisclosed evidence by the prosecution.

In order to secure a new trial on the basis of undisclosed evidence, a defendant must be able to establish 3 things:

1. the evidence was in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor;


2. the evidence is potentially exculpatory (e.g., tends to show evidence of innocence); and


3. the prosecutor's failure in disclosing the evidence prejudiced the defendant.

In a case recently litigated before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant had filed a Motion for New Trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to produce exculpatory evidence.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Murray, the defendant had been convicted of 1st Degree Murder. During the trial, the defendant had brought forward a theory of manslaughter based on the assertion that the victim was a gang member. The trial judge, however, did not allow the defendant to refer to the assertion that the decedent and his friends were part of a "gang", but only allowed him to reference their affiliation as a "group". During the trial, the witnesses also denied they were part of a gang; and a police officer who testified at trial also stated that he wasn't sure that the decent was a member of that 'group'.

Two years after the trial, 20 members of that gang were indicted by state and federal prosecutors. Those indictments, however, contained an affidavit that referenced this group as a violent street gang; identified 3 of the witnesses who testified at trial as gang members; and also identified the decedent as a gang member.

Even though that the defendant's attorney had not specifically requested the gang related information prior to the trial, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Motion for New Trial on the basis that the information contained in the affidavit could "bolster [the defendant's] theory of the case, contradict the testimony of [witnesses], and demonstrate their motive to lie."

In this regard, as a result of the newly discovered evidence, the judge ruled that there was a 'substantial miscarriage of justice' because, if the jury had heard this evidence, they could have reached a different verdict.

Contact a Massachusetts Criminal Appeals Lawyer.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Criminal Appeals: New Trial Motions" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Romero, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a split-decision where the defendant, charged with Massachusetts Gun Crimes, challenged his conviction based on insufficient evidence for "constructive possession".

The defendant in the case was in the driver's seat of a parked car - he was the owner and operator in the car - along with three other passengers who were sitting in the car as well. At 1:30 a.m., a police officer drove past the car and testified that, as he drove by, he could only see the top of 4 peoples' heads because they were crouching down in their seats. Upon seeing this, the officer turned around and parked behind the defendant's car.

As the officer began to approach the car, from about 3 feet away, he testified he could see in the car and from his vantage point one of the rear passengers reach towards the front of the car through the two front seats, this while the defendant/driver was looking side to side and also looking at the front seat passenger, who was looking at an object in his hand.

When the officer shined the flashlight into the car, the front seat passenger dropped the object in his lap, which turned out to be a gun. The defendant denied any knowledge of the gun being in the car. At trial, the defendant testified that when he picked up the front seat passenger, he showed him a gun and that he had touched it.

In his appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial as to Unlawful Possession of a Firearm based on "constructive possession".

Under Massachusetts criminal law, in order to prove "constructive possession", the Commonwealth must establish knowledge on the part of the defendant, coupled with the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the object. The court has recognized that mere presence, without more, is not enough to demonstrate knowledge or ability to and intent to exercise dominion and control, but could be inferred with the presence of other incriminating evidence.

The Appeals Court in this case rejected the defendant's challenge that there was insufficient evidence of knowledge and held that because the gun was on the lap of the front seat passenger and the defendant was sitting next to him, the evidence was sufficient.

With regard to whether there was sufficient evidence of "ability and intent to exercise control" of the gun, the Appeals Court was divided. Unfortunately, the majority relied on several "plus factors", in addition to mere presence, that warranted the inference that the defendant intended to exercise control over the firearm. Among the "plus factors" the Appeals Court relied upon were (1) ownership of the vehicle; (2) the defendant was the operator of the car; and (3) the defendant's proximity to the person who had the gun, which was in plain view (and not hidden). The court also noted other "incriminatory factors" that suggested "intent", including that the occupants were slouching down, the location of the incident on a dark street; and the time of night.

In reaching its decision, the majority of the Appeals Court reasoned that:

I believe the dissent, however, correctly pointed out that the majority in this decision essentially created a new strict liability for vehicle owners or operators, even if they truly had not intent to possess a weapon or any other unlawful object. The dissent cautioned that "courts may now punish an owner or operator of an automobile, or a property owner, for simply tolerating the presence of a weapon or contraband within the limits of their proprietary interest."

Moving forward, one would hope that a further appeal is taken and the matter is review by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Appeals Court Issues Detrimental Opinion on "Constructive Possession"" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Robert McGillivary, the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed the legal issue as to whether an intoxicated driver, who only puts the key in the vehicle's ignition without turning the car on, can be found guilty of Drunk Driving in Massachusetts.

By way of background, Robert McGillivary was convicted after trial of Operating Under the Influence of Alcohol. At trial, the evidence presented by the prosecutor was simply that he was found in the passenger's seat of the car and had turned the ignition key once to activate the car's power - but not further to turn the car on. At some point, the defendant testified that he had moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat, but did not recall ever putting the keys in the ignition. He ultimately found by the police slumped over the steering wheel. At his trial, there was absolutely no evidence that he actually drove the car at all.

McGillivary was convicted after trial and he appealed his conviction arguing that simply turning the car's power on was not "operation" for purposes of the crime of Operating Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, said that it was...

In reaching its decision, the court relied on previous Massachusetts caselaw that defined "operation" as anytime a person intentionally does an act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence sets in motion the motive power of that vehicle.

In following that definition, the court explained that turning the key in the ignition to the "on" position could therefore constitute a part of a sequence that would set the vehicle's engine in motion, thereby constituting "operation."

In my reading of this opinion, there is still an argument to be made that simply putting the keys in the ignition, without turning or activating the electrical power, does not constitute "operation" for purposes of Massachusetts Drunk Driving Laws.

The lesson learned here then, ladies and gentlemen, is that if you are in any way intoxicated and pass out in the car, make sure the keys are not in the ignition...

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Simply Putting Key In Ignition Enough for DUI / Drunk Driving" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently decided and rejected Christopher McCowen's appeal of his conviction for the Murder of Christa Worthington in 2002. In a unanimous decision, Massachusetts' highest court unanimously ruled that the defendant's appeal was without merit and found "no basis on which to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial."

Christopher McCowen, of Hyannis, Massachusetts, was convicted of the Rape and Murder of Christa Worthington in 2002 in her home in Truro on Cape Cod. McCowen was found by a jury to have first raped and then stabbed her. Worthington was found in her home as her 2.5 year old daughter was against her mother's lifeless body. The daughter was unharmed.

Despite McCowen having lost his appeal, the decision did raise some concerns, particularly with racial issues that were made public shortly after the trial, raising the concern of racial bias during jury deliberations. Specifically, after the conviction, it was revealed that, during jury deliberations, for example, one white female juror referred to McCowen as "a big black man" who had been trying to intimidate her by staring at her in the courtroom. She also stated that bruises like those found on the victim's body would result when "a big black man beats up on a small woman" These statements obviously offended fellow jurors, and in particular, a black female juror, which led to a confrontation within the jury room. As a result of these and other allegations of racial impropriety having occurred during jury deliberations, the trial judge held a 2-day hearing a year after McCowen's conviction in 2006.

Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Therefore, once a defendant files an affidavit from a juror who alleges that one or more jurors made statements that reasonably demonstrate racial or ethnic bias, and the credibility of the affidavit is in issue, the trial should should conduct a hearing to determine the truth or falsity of the affidavit's allegations.

That is what was done in McCowen's case with all the jurors over 2 days. Writing for the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Justice Ireland did not disagree with the trial judge's decision to hold such a hearing, but did state that he would have interviewed jurors more thoroughly. He elaborated that further questioning "would have given context and insight into whether" the comments and issues raised during jury deliberations were "simply small talk or indicative of implicit bias."

Notwithstanding the severe racial issues raised, the trial judge found that the juror who made those statements "did not hold actual racial bias" and concluded that the black female juror's response served the purpose of "blunting the effect" of the racial stereotype and of warning the jury of the risk of racial stereotypes infecting their deliberations.

...so in other words, there were racial issues that were of concern to the court during jury deliberations, but they did not rise to the level necessary to warrant "actual" racial bias? ...I respectfully disagree with the court's decision. McCowen should have gotten a new trial...

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rejects McCowen's Appeal of Conviction for Christa Worthington Murder" »

In an opinion released this morning, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today reversed the First Degree Murder conviction against Jerome McNulty, who in 2001, had been convicted of the murder of Linda Correia, 27, in her Salem bedroom.

In its decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that McNulty's right to be informed by the Salem Police Department of his criminal lawyer's attempt to provide advice to him had been violated. Consequently, it was error for the judge at his murder trial to admit into evidence McNulty's signed statement that he made to the Salem Police Department.

When an attorney representing a person held in custody makes it known to the police that he is seeking to reach his client to provide legal services, the police have an affirmative duty to inform the suspect immediately of the attorney's efforts. Even if the suspect had previously agreed to speak with the police, once the attorney makes that request, the suspect must be informed of his lawyer's efforts to reach him and the suspect's prior consent is invalid. Failure to do so results in a violation of a suspect's constitutional right to counsel.

No matter what the circumstances or the charges, no suspect or person in custody should agree to speak with the police unless they have first consulted with an attorney and have a lawyer present during any interviews.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Throws Out Salem Murder Conviction" »

Lawyers for John Odgren appealed to Middlesex Superior Court Judge S. Jane Haggerty earlier this week, appealing that his sentence be reduced from First Degree Murder to Second Degree Murder.

Convicted of First Degree Murder for killing 15 year-old classmate James Alenson at Lincoln-Sudbury High School in 2007, Odgren was sentenced to serve a mandatory life sentence in state prison, without the possibility of parole. If the petition was successful, John Odgren would have been parole eligible after serving 15 years in prison.

Although Odgren's defense focused on Insanity / Lack of Criminal Responsibility, arguing that he was insane at the time of the murder because of his history of emotional problems and mental health issues, including Asperger's Syndrome. Jurors that heard the case found that he was, in fact, sane at the time of the stabbing.

Continue reading "John Odgren Loses Appeal for Reduced Murder Sentence" »

Sheila Barry, of Brockton, Massachusetts, was convicted in 2006 in Plymouth Superior Court for the Murder of Admilson Goncalves. Today, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed her conviction, citing she was mentally ill when she committed the assault.

At her Murder trial, Plymouth County prosecutors alleged that Barry attacked Goncalves with a cinder block as he sat in his bicycle in Brockton in 2002 and that she continued to beat and assault him with the brick until it shattered.

In reversing her Murder conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules regarding a defendant claiming an Insanity Defense need to be changed. Prior to this decision, a defendant who voluntarily consumed alcohol could not then claim the Defendant of Lack of Responsibility, or more commonly known as the Insanity Defense.

At her trial, Barry's defense team called 5 mental health experts who testified that she was bipolar and likely also suffered from schizoaffective disorder, which sometimes leads to delusional thoughts. At one point, for example, Barry claimed that Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Center on her behalf.

In changing the status of the law, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules precluding a defending from claiming an Insanity Defense if he/she voluntarily consumes alcohol need to be changed. As a result of this decision, the Supreme Court contemplated the law to allow juries to consider whether a defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol activates, intensifies or otherwise has any affect on the person's mental illness.

Insanity Defense or Lack of Criminal Responsibility:
Under the law in Massachusetts, a person is not guilty of a crime if he lacked the 'criminal responsibility' when he committed the crime. By definition, a person is lacking in criminal responsibility if he suffers from a mental disease or defect, and as a result, either he is substantially unable to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct, or he is substantially unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

When the Defense of Lack of Criminal Responsibility (Insanity Defense) is raised, the burden is not on the defendant to prove any lack of criminal responsibility. Rather, the prosecutor must then prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the offense charged and that he was sane when he did so.

If the prosecutor persuades the jury that the defendant committed the crime charged and did not have a mental disease or defect when he committed the crime, then the jury could find that the defendant was criminally responsible.

If, however, the jurors have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect, then in order to find him criminal responsible, the prosecutor must prove that, despite any mental disease or defect, the defendant nevertheless possessed substantial capacity both to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct and was able to conform his conduct to the law.

Continue reading "Brockton Woman Gets Murder Conviction Reversed by Massachusetts Supreme Court" »

After 7 years, Jesus Silva Santiago walked out of court a free man, a second jury acquitting him of Murder in connection with the shooting death of Eugene Monteiro, 25, of Boston, Massachusetts.

The Murder allegations stemmed from an incident at Mike's Lounge in Brockton. The Plymouth County District Attorney alleged that Santiago called the victim a racial slur as he and his friends headed into the bar, saying they weren't allowed in the club. As the victim and his friends left the bar because one was underage, they passed Santiago again and he allegedly shot the victim in the chest. The Plymouth County District Attorney's Office alleged that Santiago went into the bar after the shooting because there was no other place to hide as the police were on their way.

Santiago, 35, was in custody since 2003. At his first trial in 2006, he was convicted of Murder, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned the conviction and automatic life sentence and ordered a new trial. At this second trial, a jury consisting of 4 men and 8 women deliberated 8 hours and finally acquitted him this past Thursday.

After his first trial where a jury convicted him of Murder, Santiago appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court committed error by denying his pre-trial Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications. He also claimed additional errors by the trial judge, specifically, that the judge impermissibly refused his attorneys to show evidence pertaining to an inadequate police investigation.

Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the pre-trial order denying his Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications, the Supreme Court did find error with regards to denying Santiago the opportunity to admit evidence concerning an inadequate police investigation.

Boston Criminal Lawyer Cautions Against Wrongful Convictions:
Despite having what is considered to be the premier judicial system in the world, our system of justice is not without its flaws. A wrongful conviction can occur in a number of way, the most common being Mistaken Identifications and police misconduct.

Since 1989, the Innocence Project has found that there have been 258 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States - 192 since the year 2000 alone. Most pointedly, 17 of the 258 exonerations have been people who were serving time on Death Row in various states.

According to statistics, 75% of DNA exonerations have involved mistaken eyewitness identifications. Of one of the least known mistaken identity cases involved United States President Abraham Lincoln who used the defense of mistaken identification to defend William "Duff" Armstrong in 1858. President Lincoln used a farmer's almanac to prove that a witness could not have seen Armstrong in the moonlight, as the position of the moon that night could not have provided sufficient illumination - his client was acquitted.
Case in point, in the picture above, witnesses mistakenly identified the men on the right and left as the person responsible for rapes. The actual perpetrator of the crime, however, was the man in the middle.

Continue reading "Brockton Man Acquitted of Murder after Massachusetts Supreme Court Overturns First Murder Conviction" »