Boston Criminal Lawyers Blog

Sheila Barry, of Brockton, Massachusetts, was convicted in 2006 in Plymouth Superior Court for the Murder of Admilson Goncalves. Today, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed her conviction, citing she was mentally ill when she committed the assault.

At her Murder trial, Plymouth County prosecutors alleged that Barry attacked Goncalves with a cinder block as he sat in his bicycle in Brockton in 2002 and that she continued to beat and assault him with the brick until it shattered.

In reversing her Murder conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules regarding a defendant claiming an Insanity Defense need to be changed. Prior to this decision, a defendant who voluntarily consumed alcohol could not then claim the Defendant of Lack of Responsibility, or more commonly known as the Insanity Defense.

At her trial, Barry's defense team called 5 mental health experts who testified that she was bipolar and likely also suffered from schizoaffective disorder, which sometimes leads to delusional thoughts. At one point, for example, Barry claimed that Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Center on her behalf.

In changing the status of the law, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the legal rules precluding a defending from claiming an Insanity Defense if he/she voluntarily consumes alcohol need to be changed. As a result of this decision, the Supreme Court contemplated the law to allow juries to consider whether a defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol activates, intensifies or otherwise has any affect on the person's mental illness.

Insanity Defense or Lack of Criminal Responsibility:
Under the law in Massachusetts, a person is not guilty of a crime if he lacked the 'criminal responsibility' when he committed the crime. By definition, a person is lacking in criminal responsibility if he suffers from a mental disease or defect, and as a result, either he is substantially unable to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct, or he is substantially unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

When the Defense of Lack of Criminal Responsibility (Insanity Defense) is raised, the burden is not on the defendant to prove any lack of criminal responsibility. Rather, the prosecutor must then prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the offense charged and that he was sane when he did so.

If the prosecutor persuades the jury that the defendant committed the crime charged and did not have a mental disease or defect when he committed the crime, then the jury could find that the defendant was criminally responsible.

If, however, the jurors have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect, then in order to find him criminal responsible, the prosecutor must prove that, despite any mental disease or defect, the defendant nevertheless possessed substantial capacity both to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct and was able to conform his conduct to the law.

Continue reading "Brockton Woman Gets Murder Conviction Reversed by Massachusetts Supreme Court" »

After 7 years, Jesus Silva Santiago walked out of court a free man, a second jury acquitting him of Murder in connection with the shooting death of Eugene Monteiro, 25, of Boston, Massachusetts.

The Murder allegations stemmed from an incident at Mike's Lounge in Brockton. The Plymouth County District Attorney alleged that Santiago called the victim a racial slur as he and his friends headed into the bar, saying they weren't allowed in the club. As the victim and his friends left the bar because one was underage, they passed Santiago again and he allegedly shot the victim in the chest. The Plymouth County District Attorney's Office alleged that Santiago went into the bar after the shooting because there was no other place to hide as the police were on their way.

Santiago, 35, was in custody since 2003. At his first trial in 2006, he was convicted of Murder, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned the conviction and automatic life sentence and ordered a new trial. At this second trial, a jury consisting of 4 men and 8 women deliberated 8 hours and finally acquitted him this past Thursday.

After his first trial where a jury convicted him of Murder, Santiago appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court committed error by denying his pre-trial Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications. He also claimed additional errors by the trial judge, specifically, that the judge impermissibly refused his attorneys to show evidence pertaining to an inadequate police investigation.

Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the pre-trial order denying his Motion to Suppress Photographic Identifications, the Supreme Court did find error with regards to denying Santiago the opportunity to admit evidence concerning an inadequate police investigation.

Boston Criminal Lawyer Cautions Against Wrongful Convictions:
Despite having what is considered to be the premier judicial system in the world, our system of justice is not without its flaws. A wrongful conviction can occur in a number of way, the most common being Mistaken Identifications and police misconduct.

Since 1989, the Innocence Project has found that there have been 258 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States - 192 since the year 2000 alone. Most pointedly, 17 of the 258 exonerations have been people who were serving time on Death Row in various states.

According to statistics, 75% of DNA exonerations have involved mistaken eyewitness identifications. Of one of the least known mistaken identity cases involved United States President Abraham Lincoln who used the defense of mistaken identification to defend William "Duff" Armstrong in 1858. President Lincoln used a farmer's almanac to prove that a witness could not have seen Armstrong in the moonlight, as the position of the moon that night could not have provided sufficient illumination - his client was acquitted.
Case in point, in the picture above, witnesses mistakenly identified the men on the right and left as the person responsible for rapes. The actual perpetrator of the crime, however, was the man in the middle.

Continue reading "Brockton Man Acquitted of Murder after Massachusetts Supreme Court Overturns First Murder Conviction" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court today reversed the conviction of Joann Silech-Brodeur, who was convicted of the Murder of her 70 year-old husband by stabbing him to death 34 times.

At issue in Silech-Brodeur's Criminal Appeal was whether, in establishing her Insanity Defense, the defense was obligated to give prosecutors copies of the detailed notes and statements Silech-Brodeur made to her defense psychiatric expert. She claimed that she was suffering mental problems at the time that were exacerbated by her husband's intent to divorce her. The defense psychologist testified at the trial that, during her examinations, Silech-Brodeur claimed she did not recall stabbing her husband and that the lost her sense of sight and sound during the struggle.

The trial judge, over the defendant's objection, ordered production of the defense psychologist's notes to be produced to the prosecution's own expert. This, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, went beyond the discovery limitations in Insanity Cases. The Court specifically held that "when a defendant serves notice that she will call an expert witness to testify about her mental condition at the time of the crime based on her testimonial statements, the rule only authorizes a court-ordered psychiatric examination of the defendant by the Commonwealth's expert, and nothing more."

Notwithstanding its ruling, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cited a trend toward mutual discovery and recommended that the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure review the issue and perhaps propose an amendment that might require a defendant's expert to give notice of the expert's opinion, as well as the bases for that opinion.

Click here to read the full Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Silech-Brodeur.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Orders New Trial in Murder Case" »

In reversing the Gun Crimes convictions of two men, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that police officers can no longer frisk someone during a routine encounter unless they have 'reasonable suspicion' to believe the person is involved in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jamal Martin, that defendant had been convicted of Carrying a Firearm Without a License, Carrying a Loaded Firearm, and Assault & Battery on a Police Officer. The incident occurred on October 8, 2006, when, at 10:30 a.m., Boston Police Officers were patrolling a 'high crime area' in which 'numerous shootings' had occurred and looking for a specific juvenile to execute an arrest warrant. During their patrol, they observed a young man wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up around his face and walking in the opposite direction from which the police were traveling. Although the police could not see his face, they 'thought' that this person might have an outstanding default warrant...[how does that make sense when they couldn't see his face?]

The police turned their cruiser around and engaged the young man, a teenager, in conversation. Although the police quickly realized this young man was not the person they were looking for, and simply because the young man refused to continue to speak with the police, they proceeded to ask him if he had any weapons. Despite that Martin responded that he did not, the police nonetheless continued to frisk them "for their safety." The frisk revealed a loaded gun.

In reversing Martin's conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that when an individual is stopped and searched, the police conduct must satisfy two conditions.

1. The investigatory stop must be lawful. In a street encounter, that requirement is met with the police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a crime.


2. To then engage the person in a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.

The police can't just go up to people, without legitimate reason, and just detain and search them...In my opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's recent decision serves as a message to law enforcement officers to pull the reigns a bit on questionable police practices.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Police Need 'Reasonable Suspicion' to Conduct Pat Frisks" »

If you have been following this blog, you have seen several recent posts about criminal convictions being reversed as a result of the Melendez-Diaz and Crawford decisions. These decisions have dramatically changed the landscape of permissible 'testimonial' evidence against a defendant at trial, but the scope of these decisions is limited.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Dale McMullin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pulled the reigns, so to speak, on the scope of Melendez-Diaz. The criminal defendant in this case was charged with several drunk driving related offenses, including Operating of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Liquor, Fourth Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 24(1)(a)(1); Operating After Suspension, Second Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 23); and Failure to Stop for a Police Officer (M.G.L. c. 90, section 25). After his criminal conviction, the defendant appealed challenging the admissibility, competency and sufficiency of the public records used to establish his prior convictions.

Although the defendant acknowledged that the admissibility of Registry of Motor Vehicle records was permitted by Commonwealth v. Maloney, he argued that the Maloney decision was based on the Confrontation Clause analysis in Commonwealth v. Verde, which was later overturned by Melendez-Diaz.

In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained that Melendez-Diaz explicitly acknowledged that a clerk's affidavit authenticating an official record is not 'testimonial' for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, business and public records are generally admissible and not confrontational because they have been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purposes of proving some fact at trial.

Continue reading "Court Documents Admitted in Drunk Driving Trial Not Violative of Sixth Amendment's Right to Confrontation" »

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Jorge Vasquez, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently overturned the conviction of the defendant, who had been tried and convicted of Possession of Cocaine, as well as Distribution of Cocaine. Despite his criminal defense lawyer's failing to object at trial to the admission of the Massachusetts State Police Crime Laboratory Certificates of Drug Analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court still reversed his convictions as a result of his being deprive of his Right to Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

At his criminal trial, the prosecutor did not call the Massachusetts State Police Crime Analyst at trial, but simply admitted the 'Drug Certificates'. The Drug Certificates were signed by the analyst, but the court found a Sixth Amendment violation because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the drug analyst. Although this was the preferred practice not too long ago, in the recent case of Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court ruled that drug certificates are testimonial in nature whose admission into evidence against a criminal defendant triggers the protections of the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court further ruled that, without the admission of the Drug Certificates or testimony certifying the seized substances were, in fact, cocaine, the defendant's convictions on the charges could not stand and must be reversed. Although there was evidence that the 'substances' were "consistent with cocaine" and testimony from police officers relating to the likeness of the substances with cocaine, this was simply circumstantial evidence. Although a conviction can stand on only circumstantial evidence, the convictions in this case had to be reversed because the court could not say whether a jury would still have convicted had the improperly introduced Drug Certificates not been introduced.

Notably, that the defendant's criminal defense attorney did not object at trial to the admission of the Drug Certificate was not held against him during at his appeal of his convictions. The Supreme Court explained that, because an objection to the admission of the Drug Certificate would have been futile, the rationale for denying the defendant review on this issue doesn't apply.

Continue reading "Drug Conviction Overturned for Constitutional Violation" »

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jason Loadholt, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled on whether a defendant's criminal prosecution for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition is violative of a person's 'right to bear arms' as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In his appeal to the SJC for his Gun/Firearms Charges, the defendant claimed that Massachusetts could not prosecute him for the various gun and ammunitions charges for not first having obtained a Firearms Identification Card because the United States Constitution guaranteed him, via the Second Amendment, his 'Right to Bear Arms'.

In rejecting the defendant's Constitutional claims in his appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned, citing United States v. Cruikshank, that the Second Amendment "does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government." Rather, the Second Amendment means that it shall not be infringed any further by Congress, as opposed to the States. The Court explained that the Second Amendment "is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government."

At the end of the day, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment guarantees only an individuals right to keep and bear arms for defensive purposes. Without explicit saying as much, the Court seems to have upheld the requirement of obtaining a Firearms Identification Card for purposes of firearms and ammunition possession.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rejects Challenge for Gun Rights" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recent decision of Commonwealth v. Porter P., a juvenile, focused on whether a person temporarily staying in room in a homeless transitional center is entitled to a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' against unlawful searches and searches. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a 5-2 decision, ruled that they do!

By way of background, the juvenile defendant and his mother had moved into a room at the Roxbury Multi-Service Center Family House Shelter in March 2006, which provides temporary housing for homeless families and assists them towards securing a permanent home. A few months later, the shelter's director heard rumors that the juvenile defendant had a gun and then contacted the Boston Police Department. The next morning, five Boston Police Officers arrived at the shelter, and with the permission from the Roxbury shelter's directors, searched the juvenile's room and found a .40 caliber Glock firearm. The juvenile was immediately arrested for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm; Unlawful Possession of Ammunition; and Delinquency.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in ruling for the juvenile defendant, found that

"the room that the juvenile and his mother shared at the shelter was a transitional living space, but it was nonetheless their home...".

As a result, they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 'home' at the shelter, and the Boston Police Officers' search, without a warrant or consent by them, was violative of their 4th Amendment Right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Justice Ralph Gants, the author of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in this case, ruled that even the shelter's director did not have the 'actual authority' to consent to the police entry into the room to search for a gun. Justice Gants explained that the Roxbury shelter's director was not a co-inhabitant of the room, and although the shelter's guidelines permitted them to call the police, the guidelines did not expressly authorize the police to enter a resident's room and to search for evidence of a crime without consent or a warrant.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Homeless Shelters Entitled to 4th Amendment Privacy Protections" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently refused to overturn the murder conviction of a man who later found out his criminal defense lawyer had a prior dating relationship with the prosecutor in the case, and then with another prosecutor in the District Attorney's Appellate Division while he was handling his criminal appeal.

The defendant, John Stote, was convicted after a criminal jury trial for the 1997 murder of a man in Springfield, and then disposing of his body in the Connecticut River. In his appeal, the convicted murder appealed his conviction, claiming his criminal trial counsel's prior dating relationship with the prosecuting attorney created a conflict of interest.
In its decision, Commonwealth v. John Stote, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected both of the Defendant's arguments on appeal:

1. that the defendant's criminal trial counsel should have told him of his prior personal relationship with the Hamden County prosecutor; and


2. that the criminal attorney further failed to inform the defendant of his dating relationship with another prosecutor in the Hamden District Attorney's Office Appellate Division while he was then representing the defendant on the appeal for his murder conviction.

In her decision, Judge Marshall of the Massachusetts Supreme Court frowned upon the trial attorney's failure to disclose his relationships with prosecutors to his client, but ultimately ruled that there was neither "an actual conflict of interest nor a potential conflict that resulted in material prejudice in [the defendant's] appeal." Despite rejecting the defendant's appeal, the Court did note that an attorney's professional and ethical responsibility to inform their clients of any intimate personal relationship that might impair his ability to provide unimpaired assistance of counsel.

Continue reading "Criminal Defense Lawyer's Relationship with Prosecutor Not Enough to Overturn Murder Conviction" »

A defendant who was convicted for the gun crimes of Carrying a Firearm Without a License and Carrying a Loaded Firearm recently had his convictions overturned because the admission of the Ballistics Certificate, without live expert testimony, violated his Right to Confrontation under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

At his criminal jury trial in the District Court, the prosecutor sought to prove that the gun at issue was an operable firearm with evidence consisting only of the Ballistics Certificate, which is simply a police ballistician's certification that the firearm has been examined, tested and found to be functional. The ballistician who examined the firearm was not called as a witness by the prosecutor at trial, and therefore was not available to the defendant's criminal defense lawyer for cross-examination. The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that, because the ballistician was not made available to the defense for cross-examination of his findings, the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. Read the full Massachusetts Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. William Rivera.

The reversal of the defendants gun convictions follows the recent ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, where the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the prosecution cannot prove its case with affidavits and without the benefit of live witness testimony. The case of Melendez-Diaz involved a drug trial where the prosecutor admitted a Certificate of Drug Analysis in lieu of the chemist's testimony that the contraband seized by the police was, in fact, cocaine.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Supreme Court Reverses Gun Conviction for Constitutional Violation" »

The U.S. States Supreme Court recently ruled that a defendant's Constitutional Right (per the 6th Amendment) was violated when the court refused to allow his uncle from watching the jury voir dire process at his criminal trial. As a result the ruling, the man had his cocaine trafficking conviction overturned.

In general, because the public has a First Amendment Right to access the jury voir dire process, a criminal defendant also has a Sixth Amendment Right to a public trial. In other words, the Supreme Court essentially stated that it doesn't make sense for the public to have the right of access to public proceedings, but to then deny a defendant his right to to a public trial.

In this particular case, Presley v. Georgia, the criminal defendant's lawyer objected to the trial court from excluding the defendant's uncle from sitting in the same room with prospective jurors. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, in a criminal trial, the courts are obligated to accommodate the public access.

Continue reading "Criminal Defendants' Right to a Public Trial Extends to Jury Selection Process" »